ABSTRACT Directional modulation (DM) technique based on artificial noise (AN) enables the physical layer security (PLS) for wireless communications in free space. However, on one hand, the introduction of AN results in less power efficient for a DM system; on the other hand, the AN-aided DM technique is strongly dependent on the channel state information (CSI) of transceivers, which greatly limits its practical application. What is more, when the eavesdropper (EVE) is slowly approaching the legitimate user (LU) or the EVE and the LU are in the same direction, the transmission security cannot be guaranteed. To circumvent these problems, DM technique with multiple parameters weighted-type fractional Fourier transform (MP-WFRFT) and chaotic scrambling (CS) aided is proposed in this paper to realize the powerefficient and security-enhanced wireless transmissions. Then, the symbol error rate (SER), secrecy rate, robustness, and anti-interception performance of the proposed method are analyzed and simulated. The simulation results are presented to verify that the proposed method is more power-efficient than the traditional AN-aided DM schemes, and the PLS is guaranteed due to the proposed approach, albeit knowing the intended direction for an EVE.
makes confidential information transmissions more vulnerable to malicious attacks, including both the passive eavesdropping for data interception and the active jamming for disrupting legitimate transmissions [1] [2] [3] .
Conventionally, key-based high-layer encryption techniques have been adopted broadly to secure data transmission, regardless whether the communication systems are wired or wireless [4] [5] [6] . However, these state-of-the-art encryption algorithms, deemed secure enough nowadays, may be insufficient or even not suitable with the development of mobile Internet and intense computational resource availability. Fortunately, keyless physical layer security (PLS) techniques enable the secure transmission by only exploiting the characteristics of wireless channels to avoid spectral resources and signaling overhead wasted [7] [8] [9] . Specially, based on the randomness of wireless channels, channel codes were employed to ensure communication security and reliability simultaneously at the physical layer, such as, Wyner codes [8] , polar codes [10] , low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes [11] , and fountain codes [12] .
In the last decade, an emerging promising technique named directional modulation (DM), mainly aiming at physical layer security, has attracted extension studies for its unique characteristic. The characteristic is that DM creates desired amplitude and phase in desired direction(s) for each symbol while distorting the symbols in all other directions [3] .
Generally speaking, DM is a transmitter side technology, which can be classified into two categories according to the implementation method. One is the optimization method at the radio frequency (RF) frontend (e.g., [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] ). The other is the artificial noise (AN) aided method at the base band in the literatures [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] .
In fact, the initial DM works were achieved by reconfiguring the antenna radiating elements during the transmission. Here, the direction-dependent signal was obtained by altering the effective length and scattering property of a reflector [13] [14] [15] or by re-routing the excitation currents on radiating structures [16] . Similarly, the excitation weighting updates were performed utilizing attenuators and phase shifters [17] [18] [19] [20] . Bit error rate (BER) driven DM synthesis methods were demonstrated in [17] , [18] , [21] , [22] . Another types of DM synthesis methods by constraining different properties of array far-field radiation pattern were described in [23] , [24] . Besides, wireless transmissions at the RF frontend using antenna subset modulation (ASM) [25] , a switched antenna array [26] , a linear sparse array (LSA) [27] , [28] , and a frequency diversity array (FDA) [29] , [30] were proposed and further developed. However, the implementation of DM at the RF stage is lack of flexibility, which results in high complexity for the DM signals synthesis. Therefore, the AN-aided DM implementation at the baseband instead of at the RF frontend is emerging at the right moment. The first attempt to link DM systems and AN concepts was presented in [31] , which did not elucidate some important aspects related to a DM system design. The authors in [32] , [33] further developed AN and orthogonal vector concepts for the single/multi-beam DM synthesis. Then, a robust synthesis method based on AN was put forward in [34] for singlebeam scenario, in [35] for multi-beam scenario. Recently, a secure and precise wireless transmission scheme by joint use of AN projection, phase alignment, random subcarrier selection (RSCS) based on orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) and DM was proposed for PLS in [36] . Furthermore, the AN-aided methods were also applied into FDA to achieve DM synthesis in [37] [38] [39] .
Obviously, the introduction of AN lowers the power efficiency inevitably. For some power sensitive scenarios, the AN-aided methods may be not suitable. Meanwhile, in an AN-aided DM system, the CSI required for enabling PLS may be imperfect or even unavailable. This has an abominable impact on the design of the beamforming vector and the projection matrix. Above all, all DM works mentioned above have their Achilles' heel when eavesdroppers locate within the information beam-width of the DM system [13] . Thus, this paper is proposed to circumvent these problems by integrating the cryptographic techniques on physical layer for a DM system. Combining cryptographic techniques with DM technique offers another way to improve the security performance significantly. Here, the joint use of multiple cryptographic techniques includes multiple parameters weighted-type fractional Fourier transform (MP-WFRFT) and Chaotic Scrambling (CS).
The fractionalization of Fourier transform was first suggested in 1980 as a novel way to solve the Schröfidinger equation [40] . Then, the concept of WFRFT was brought up by Shih [41] . The definition of MP-WFRFT was given in [42] , [43] and it was applied to signal processing. After the WFRFT transform, the distribution of the symbolic energy in the time-frequency domain will be changed, resulting in the rotation and fission of the constellations, thereby it can be applied to the PLS by concealing the signals. In the last decade, the WFRFT technique has been applied to PLS extensively [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] . An original scheme for covert communication based on waveform overlay with WFRFT signals was proposed in [44] . In [45] , 4-WFRFT was applied in hybrid carrier spread spectrum system. In the DFT-based communication systems, the WFRFT operation was used as a precoding scheme to suppress the narrow-band interference (NBI) in [46] . The WFRFT technique and parallel combinatory spreading technology were integrated for secret communications in [47] . A novel transmission scheme based on constellation rotation and WFRFT is proposed to enhance the physical layer security in polarization modulation based dualpolarized satellite communications in [48] . In [49] , A novel constellation-splitting criterion in MP-WFRFT modulations was presented for guaranteeing the communication security. The MP-WFRFT technique was also applied into a spatial modulation system for PLS in [50] .
Chaotic Scrambling can be viewed as another cryptographic technique at the physical layer. Chaos-based communication has emerged as a promising way to provide data confidentiality due to its high initial condition sensitivity [51] . The transmitted signals are concealed with chaotic sequence, which has a highly unpredictable and random-look nature. The chaotic sequence is sensitive to the parameters' changes and a small variation of any parameter changes the results considerably [52] , [53] . Therefore, it can counteract the malicious eavesdroppers efficiently in a DM system.
The amalgamation of WFRFT and DM techniques was proposed to enhance the PLS for the very first time in literature [54] . On the basis of their work, we put forward a practical secure wireless transmission scheme to transmit confidential information to the legitimate user (LU) by the joint use of multiple techniques including MP-WFRFT, CS, and DM. Totally speaking, the main contributions can be summarized as follows:
(1) The MP-WFRFT technique is introduced into the DM system for the first time. In doing so, the performance of the PLS is significantly enhanced compared with a traditional DM system.
(2) The CS technique is also applied into the DM system for the very first time. The anti-interception performance is remarkably improved compared with a conventional DM system.
(3) The symbol error rate (SER), secrecy rate, robustness and anti-interception performance of the proposed scheme are analyzed, simulated and verified.
The remaining part of this paper is structured as follows. A detailed review of the principle of MP-WFRFT and CS techniques is presented in Section II. The scheme of the directional modulation with the help of WFRFT and CS techniques is proposed in Section III. Then, Section IV provides the analysis of the SER, secrecy rate, robustness, and anti-interception performance of the proposed scheme. Next, Section V gives simulation results and discussions. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
Throughout the paper, the following notations will be used: Signs (·) −1 , (·) + , (·) T and (·) H designate the inverse, the Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse, the transpose and the complex conjugate transpose operations of a matrix, respectively; Operator |·| represents modulus; Operator ''•'' denotes the Hadamard product; The operations F 
II. REVIEW OF MP-WFRFT AND CS

A. MP-WFRFT
The MP-WFRFT transforms a sequence of N complex numbers, X 0 (n) :
where α ∈ R is the transform order, V ∈ Z 1×2M is the introduced scaling vector.
The definitions of normalized DFT and normalized inverse DFT are given by
and
in several, where N is the interval length of DFT, n and k denote the discrete time and frequency, separately. Nevertheless, we find that the integer-order DFT is a periodic operation. Repeated the applications of the DFT would bring the sequence back to itself. As we know, there are only four different integer-order DFT functions as follows.
Therefore, it is reasonable to consider that any MP-WFRFT is a weighted combination of these four functions.
The l-th weight coefficient ω l (α, V) is obtained by
The transform order α has a periodicity of M , i.e.,
Then, substituting Eq. (6) into Eq. (1), we have
This is the periodical property of the MP-WFRFT operation.
The MP-WFRFT can be reduced to an ordinary DFT when α is an integer, i.e.,
Meanwhile, MP-WFRFT satisfies the additive property, which is given by
where α, β ∈ R are two arbitrary real numbers.
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Moreover, MP-WFRFT satisfies the linear property, which is given by (10) where X 0 (n), Y 0 (n) ∈ C 1×L are two complex sequences, and a, b ∈ C are two complex numbers.
The inverse of MP-WFRFT F
. Therefore, we can easily recover the original sequence X 0 (n) from the transformed sequence S 0 (n) by doing α order MP-IWFRFT, i.e., −α order MP-WFRFT, as follows (11) where S l (n) denotes the l-th times DFT of S 0 (n), and S l (n),
The proof is seen in Appendix. Take QPSK (Quadrature Phase Shift Keying) signals for example, the constellations after MP-WFRFT with different transformation parameters (α, V) will occur rotation, diffusion, splitting and confusion as shown in Fig. 1 , which is beneficial for physical layer security.
B. CS
The complex dynamic behaviors of chaotic scrambling meet the need for confidentiality. Therefore, CS has been widely used in the field of signal encryption. In this paper, CS is introduced into the DM system to enhance the physical layer security for the first time. As we known, one dimensional Logistic map with the advantages of simple structure and excellent performance makes it one of the most widely used chaotic maps. Thus, we adopt one dimensional Logistic map as chaos model to generate the CS sequence, which is given by [53] 
where x 0 is an arbitrary number between zero and one, and x n represents the nth value iterated by Eq. (12) . The parameter µ denotes bifurcation parameter, the values of interest for which are those in the interval (0, 4]. Once the system parameter µ is determinate, for any initial value, the Logistic map can iteratively generate a unique sequence. When µ falls into the interval (3.569945, 4], the sequence will fall into chaos. Slight variations for the initial value x 0 yield dramatically different results over time, which is a prime characteristic of chaos. This characteristic makes it very suitable as an ideal scrambling sequence to enhance physical layer security.
Still take QPSK signals into account, the signals' constellations after the CS operations with different transformation parameters (µ, x 0 ) will occur random rotation as displayed in Fig. 2 , which is beneficial for physical layer security. 
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROPOSED DM TECHNIQUE BASED ON MP-WFRFT AND CS A. SYSTEM MODEL
A multiple-input single-output (MISO) DM system with N transmitting antennas and one single receiving antenna is adopted for a LU or an Eve sketched in Fig. 3 . Here, the base station has a-priori information about the direction of the LU, but not of the potential Eve. However, the ideas proposed in this paper can also be extended to a multiple-input multipleoutput (MIMO) system for multiple LUs or eavesdroppers. A uniform linear array (ULA) equipped with omnidirectional antennas is utilized for the base station (BS), i.e., the DM transmitter. Generally, the maximum interelement spacing is set to half a wavelength of the frequency of interest to avoid spatial aliasing. Our method works for uniform planar arrays and uniform cylindrical arrays, i.e., 2D/3D multidimensional periodic arrays. Owing to the fact that the ULA positioned on the x-y plane cannot resolve pitch angle, the angular location of the receivers is only specified by the azimuth angle.
Without loss of generality, assuming transmitting signals via a narrow-band channel and the receivers located in the far-field region. Let θ d and θ e denote the azimuth angle of the LU and the Eve, respectively.
The normalized steering vector for an arbitrary receiver located along the direction θ can be written as
where ϕ θ (n) is given by
where d denotes the interelement spacing, and λ = c f 0 is the free-space wavelength, where c is the speed of light and f 0 is the carrier frequency of interest. For a ULA, d = λ 2.
B. DM TECHNIQUE BASED ON MP-WFRFT AND CS
The architecture of the base station for the proposed DM scheme based on MP-WFRFT and CS is depicted in Fig. 4 . The novel scheme introduces two key-based modules into a conventional DM system simultaneously. One is the MP-WFRFT module with parameters (α, V). The other is the CS module with parameters (µ, x 0 ). The encryption of the signals is achieved via MP-WFRFT and CS operations, which leads to the rotation, splitting, dispersion and confusion of the constellation of the signals.
For the sake of clarity, in the proposed scheme, the source data consists of modulated symbols, like M-ary PSK, or MQAM (Multiple Quadrature Amplitude Modulation) symbols. Here, the transmitting symbol vector can be written as
where s m denotes the mth symbol, and it satisfies E{s * m s m } = 1. Meanwhile, s can also be viewed as a symbol frame of length L. Firstly, do MP-WFRFT operation with parameters (α, V) on the symbol vector s, which yields
where
and si represents the ith times DFT of the symbol vector s.
The implementation of the MP-WFRFT operation is demonstrated in Fig. 5 . According to the basic properties of DFT, the sequence X 0 and X 1 can be reversed to get X 2 and X 3 . Therefore, the MP-WFRFT operation needs only one DFT, two sequence inversion, a few multiplication and addition operations in practice. Meanwhile, using Eq. (11), we can easily recover the symbol vector s by s = F (−α,V) [u] .
Secondly, before doing CS operation, we need to generate a chaotic sequence x = [x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x L−1 ] via L −1 times iteration by Eq. (12) with the parameters (µ, x 0 ) . Next, the chaotic scrambling sequence c can be defined as
Similarly, the chaotic descrambling sequence c is given by
Then, the CS is operated on the vector u, which yields
Here, the implementation of the CS operation is displayed in Fig. 6 . Thirdly, in order to match the N antenna elements, the modulated symbol vector should be processed with a precoding matrix P. The normalized steering vector of the LU is h(θ d ). In order to achieve the DM, the pre-coding matrix P at the base station side can be given by
Obviously,
After pre-coding, the radiated signal matrix q ∈ C N ×L for N antenna elements for L symbols can be written as
where P t is the total transmit power. Without loss of generality, assuming a narrow-band lineof-sight (LOS) channel with perfect synchronization and symbol-rate sampling, the received signal vector y = [y 1 , . . . , y L ] along with any direction θ can be written as
where n = [n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n L ] is the normalized additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) vector with probability density function (PDF) being n ∼ CN (0 L×1 , σ 2 n I L ). Meanwhile, assuming that the private keys of the MP-WFRFT and CS operations are exchanging perfectly for the LU through a secure channel, the eavesdroppers cannot acquire the private parameters. Therefore, for a LU, the received signal vectors are operated by the inverse CS and inverse MP-WFRFT with the known parameters (µ, x 0 ) and (−α, V), successively, which yields
Using Eq. (18) to Eq. (24), we expand Eq. (25) as
which along with Eq. (8) (27) where However, for an Eve located in the direction θ e , the received signal vector can be given by
Substituting Eq. (23) into Eq. (28), we have
Here, n EVE is still viewed as the normalized AWGN vector with PDF being n EVE ∼ CN (0 L×1 , σ 2 n EVE I L ). It is easy to see that the received signal vector of the Eve consists of three parts. The first part is the scrambled confidential information distorted by the CS and MP-WFRFT operations. The second part is the equivalent AN caused by MP-WFRFT operation mostly. And the third part is the normal AWGN. Even though there is no practical AN inserted in the emitting signal vectors, the operation of MP-WFRFT can introduce equivalent AN into eavesdroppers' receiver, which indicates that the proposed DM scheme is more powerefficient than the traditional AN aided DM system.
On the other hand, the eavesdroppers have no a-priori direction information of the LU and the parameters for MP-WFRFT and CS operations, which makes it impossible to recover the confidential information for Eves. What's more, even if the eavesdroppers are located near the LU or even at the same position as the LU, the physical layer security can also be guaranteed for the excellent anti-interception performance of the MP-WFRFT and CS techniques. Therefore, combining cryptographic technologies with a DM system offers a new way to improve the security performance significantly.
In summary, the detailed algorithm process of the DM scheme based on MP-WFRFT and CS is shown in Table 1 . 
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
Symbol error rate, secrecy rate, robustness and antiinterception performance are four key criterions to evaluate the performance of a DM system [3] . Then, the SER, secrecy rate, robustness and anti-interception performance of the proposed scheme are analyzed in this section, hereinafter.
A. SYMBOL ERROR RATE
For the sake of analysis, assume σ 2 n LU = σ 2 n EVE = σ 2 n , neglect the path loss, and normalize the baseband symbols. Therefore, the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) r of the received symbols can be given by
By comparison, the received SNR of a conventional DM system can be expressed as
where β ∈ (0, 1] is the power allocation coefficient for the confidential information. In the following paper, only QPSK modulation is taken into account. The theoretical SER of QPSK signals in AWGN channel can be calculated as [55] 
2 )dx. Assuming that the weighting terms, s, s 1 , s 2 ,and s 3 in Eq. (29) have the same average power, i.e., P t 4. For eavesdroppers, the received symbols will be affected because the MP-WFRFT operation would cause the rotation and splitting of the signal in the complex plane. So, let the impact factor be cos θ rot . Since the energy of the signals before and after the MP-WFRFT operation is conserved, we have
The useful information is only the weighted term of the original signal s. The average power of the signals received by the eavesdropping receiver is written as
To simplify Eq. (33), let V = 0, we can rewrite Eq. (33) as
Meanwhile, the signals are scrambled by the sequence c. We spread the sequence c using Euler's formula as c = cos(2π x) + j sin(2πx).
Then, the average signal energy received by the eavesdropping receiver after the CS operation is equivalent to P CS = P t 4 · cos 2 απ 4 cos 2 απ 2 cos 2 3απ 4 cos(2π x). (37) At this point, the received SNR r EVE for an Eve is transformed to
Therefore, substituting Eq. (30) into Eq. (32), the SER for a LU is derived as
Substituting Eq. (31) into Eq. (32), the SER for a LU aided with AN can be written as
Substituting Eq. (38) into Eq. (32), the SER for an Eve is expressed as
It is noted that the SER for a LU aided with AN is affected by the power allocation factor β and for an Eve, it is affected by the parameters (α, V) for MP-WFRFT and the chaotic scrambling sequence x both. VOLUME 7, 2019
B. SECRECY RATE
In the light of Eq. (27) , the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) of the LU is given by
By dint of Eq. (42), the achievable rate of the link between the BS and the LU can be expressed as
According to Eq. (29) and Eq. (37), the SINR of the Eve is given by
Using Eq. (44), the achievable rate of the link between the BS and the Eve can be obtained by
Thus, the secrecy rate of the proposed DM scheme is defined as
C. ROBUSTNESS
In this part, the robustness of the proposed DM system aided with MP-WFRFT and CS techniques is studied about the imperfect bearing of the LU. Generally, in order to achieve the DM, the base station is assumed to know the direction of the LU. However, in the actual application scenario, whether using GPS positioning or the traditional DOA estimation algorithms, there is a certain angle error in the orientation information. The estimated direction θ d of the LU is written as
where θ d is the estimated angle error. Then, the corresponding steering vector and pre-coding matrix with estimated errors should be updated to
where θ d is the estimated angle error. Therefore, the normalization characteristic would be affected by the estimated error. Simulations are provided in Section V to analyze the security of the proposed system, which can retain as long as the estimated error within acceptable limits.
D. ANTI-INTERCEPTION PERFORMANCE
In the proposed DM system based on MP-WFRFT and CS, the BS and the LU share the private parameters via a secure channel. The LU can acquire the perfect parameters for inverse MP-WFRFT and inverse CS operations. In a worse scenario, the Eve knows the MP-WFRFT and CS operations and cracks them with imperfect parameters.
Next, we will analyze the impact of the MP-WFRFT and CS operations on constellation. The constellation of the QPSK modulated signals will occur rotation and splitting via MP-WFRFT modulation. The rotation angle can be expressed as
It is noted that the rotation angle is only dependent on the transform order α. When the value of α is small, the constellation rotation is not obvious, and the anti-interception performance is not strong enough. Therefore, the CS is introduced after the MP-WFRFT modulation. The phase of the signals will be further rotated after the CS operation. The extra rotation angle can be written as
Therefore, the total rotation angle can be derived as
Meanwhile, the constellation of the synthesized signal will be diffusion with the variation of parameters. When eavesdroppers do not know the MP-WFRFT and CS operations on the transmitting signals, it is impossible to crack the confidential information. Even if the eavesdrops know the MP-WFRFT and CS operations, it is an extremely hard task for them to scan out the correct parameters. In order to evaluate the anti-interception performance of the proposed DM system, we conduct related simulations through Monte Carlo methods provided in Section V. Table 2 compares the proposed DM scheme with conventional DM scheme and AN-aided DM scheme, from which the main advantages of the proposed DM scheme can be summarized as follows:
E. COMPARISONS FOR PROPOSED DM, CONVENTIONAL DM AND AN-AIDED DM SCHEMES
(1) Compared with conventional DM scheme, the computational complexity increases just a bit for the proposed DM scheme. However, compared with AN-aided DM scheme, our method has a lower computation complexity.
(2) Since no AN is inserted in the transmitting signals, the proposed DM scheme is more power-efficient than the AN-aided DM scheme.
(3) Most importantly, beneficiated from the inherent security of the MP-WFRFT and CS techniques, the transmission security of the proposed DM scheme can also be guaranteed even if the Eve's direction is close to or the same as the LU's.
In a word, our proposed DM scheme is more powerefficient and much securer with very little complexity increased.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, the SER, secrecy rate, robustness and antiinterception performance of the MP-WFRFT and CS Aided DM system are simulated. The main detailed simulation parameters are listed in Table 3 . A. SYMBOL ERROR RATE Fig. 7 depicts the SER performances of the LU and the Eve located in the desired direction versus SNR for the proposed DM scheme and the traditional AN aided DM system. It is easy to see that 1) the simulation results of the SER are almost identical to the theoretical calculation results; 2) the SNR requested for the proposed scheme is about 1 dB less than that of the AN aided DM scheme when SERs are less than 10 −2 ; 3) when the Eve located within the information beam-width region, the SER is as good as the AN aided DM system, while the proposed DM scheme can prevent eavesdroppers from eavesdropping. Fig. 8 demonstrates the SER performances versus azimuth for the proposed DM system and the AN aided DM scheme with the same SNR, respectively. As we can see, the information beam-width of the proposed DM scheme is much narrower than that of the AN-aided DM system due to the power-efficient. For eavesdroppers, they can crack the confidential information using high sensitive receiver in the AN-aided DM system near the desired direction. However, the security can also be guaranteed in the proposed DM system, no matter where the eavesdropper is or how sensitive the receiver is. Fig. 9 (a) displays the achievable rate of the LU versus SNR for the proposed DM system and the AN-aided system with different power allocation factors. As expected, the achievable rates of the LU for the proposed system are much higher than that of the AN-aided system when the SNR is the same. Meanwhile, the achievable rates are decreasing as the power distribution factor decreases. Fig. 9 (b) depicts the achievable rate of the EVE versus SNR for the proposed DM system. As we can see, the achievable rates of the EVE are approximately 0 bps/Hz with different parameters for MP-WFRFT and CS operations. Fig. 9 (c) demonstrates the secrecy rate for the proposed DM system and the AN-aided system. The simulation results are similar to Fig. 9 (a) . Obviously, the secrecy rate of the proposed scheme is higher than that of the AN-aided system. Meanwhile, the secrecy rates are always positive wherever the Eves are located. Compared with the AN-aided scheme, the proposed system is much more secure and reliable.
B. SECRECY RATE
The SER performance versus SNR with different imperfect estimation errors of the LU's desired direction are displayed in Fig. 10 . It is easy to see that for a given SER (e.g., SER = 10 −4 ), there is about 1.0 dB loss of the SNR when estimated angle error is θ d = 2 • . Therefore, as long as the estimated angle errors are less than 2•, at most 1 dB extra SNR is requested to achieve the same SER as the ideal case. 
C. ANTI-INTERCEPTION PERFORMANCE
The anti-interception performance of the MP-WFRFT and CS operations is depicted in Fig. 11 and Fig. 12 , respectively. As we can see, the SER performance of the proposed DM scheme will worsen much along with a bit mismatched parameters. The eavesdroppers want to recover the relatively accurate confidential information, they should search for the exact parameter α within the error α ≤ 0.01, V = 0, α ≤ 0.002, V = 0, for the MP-WFRFT operation; for the exact parameter x 0 within the error x 0 ≤ 10 −17 , for the CS operation. Especially, owing to the high initial condition sensitivity of the CS operation, the SERs of the proposed DM are always close to 75% when the scanning errors are no less than 10 −16 . Meanwhile, by contrast, the changing rules of constellations in the proposed DM system are more complicated, and the constellations have good deceptiveness as shown in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 . Therefore, the proposed DM system can achieve physical layer security effectively.
VI. CONCLUSION
With the assistance of the MP-WFRFT and Chaotic Scrambling techniques, a power-effect and effective DM system aided with the MP-WFRFT and the CS operation is proposed for the very first time. The SER, secrecy rate, robustness, and the anti-interception performance are analyzed, simulated and verified, which indicates it has the advantages of power efficiency and the information beam-width security for the proposed scheme compared with the conventional AN aided system. Moreover, it is of considerable interest to extend to the multi-beam DM system.
APPENDIX
In this appendix, the derivation of Eq. (11) will be given. Using the property in Eq. (9), we have 
The DFT can also be expressed as the DFT matrix, a Vandermonde matrix, introduced by Sylvester as follow.
where F is the transformation matrix, which is given by 
where w N = e −j2π/N . Therefore, we can rewrite Eq. (1) as 
It is noted that the coefficients matrix W is a unitary matrix, which satisfies W −1 (α, V) = W H (α, V) = W(−α, V).
Because of the inverse property expressed in Eq. (58), X 0 can be obtained by the −α order MP-WFRFT of S 0 easily.
The proof is completed.
